This paper explores the rationality of status concerns amongst co-workers and the impact of such rational status concerns on a firm's profits. We find that it is individually rational for agents in a firm to develop and exhibit status concerns. Workers are, by their choices of status concerns, able to transfer surplus from the the rm to themselves. Further, relative concerns are shaped by the relative strengths and weaknesses of the workers in the firm. Finally, a firm's profit is reduced (relative to the benchmark moral-hazard model) by workers who exhibit such "endogenous" relative concerns
This thesis consists of three self-contained chapters. Chapter 1 develops a two-sector, bivariate ...
The paper identifies conditions under which ‘inefficient’ favouritism emerges as an optimal outcome ...
UnrestrictedIn this work I show that if risk-averse agents prefer both to be richer in absolute term...
This paper explores the rationality of status concerns amongst co-workers and the impact of such rat...
We study the effects of local status, where workers compare their wage to the wage of other workers ...
We study the effects of local status, where workers compare their wage to the wage of other workers ...
Following recent empirical evidence which indicates the importance of rank for the determination of...
We study the consequences of concern for relative position and status in a public good economy. We c...
AbstractIn a principal–agent model, we find that firms may not always benefit from the relative conc...
This paper aims to provide a survey on the studies on incentive, especially non-monetary incentive l...
We study the e¤ects of local status, where workers compare their wage to the wage of other workers w...
Firms can motivate workers by offering them social status. Much of the literature argues that a rise...
This paper characterizes the structure of monetary incentives in an organization with varying differ...
I consider a simple linear principal-agent model with one principal and two agents and explore the r...
This paper aims to provide a survey on the studies on incentive, especially non-monetary incentive l...
This thesis consists of three self-contained chapters. Chapter 1 develops a two-sector, bivariate ...
The paper identifies conditions under which ‘inefficient’ favouritism emerges as an optimal outcome ...
UnrestrictedIn this work I show that if risk-averse agents prefer both to be richer in absolute term...
This paper explores the rationality of status concerns amongst co-workers and the impact of such rat...
We study the effects of local status, where workers compare their wage to the wage of other workers ...
We study the effects of local status, where workers compare their wage to the wage of other workers ...
Following recent empirical evidence which indicates the importance of rank for the determination of...
We study the consequences of concern for relative position and status in a public good economy. We c...
AbstractIn a principal–agent model, we find that firms may not always benefit from the relative conc...
This paper aims to provide a survey on the studies on incentive, especially non-monetary incentive l...
We study the e¤ects of local status, where workers compare their wage to the wage of other workers w...
Firms can motivate workers by offering them social status. Much of the literature argues that a rise...
This paper characterizes the structure of monetary incentives in an organization with varying differ...
I consider a simple linear principal-agent model with one principal and two agents and explore the r...
This paper aims to provide a survey on the studies on incentive, especially non-monetary incentive l...
This thesis consists of three self-contained chapters. Chapter 1 develops a two-sector, bivariate ...
The paper identifies conditions under which ‘inefficient’ favouritism emerges as an optimal outcome ...
UnrestrictedIn this work I show that if risk-averse agents prefer both to be richer in absolute term...